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Ying Chen†and Wojciech Olszewski‡
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Abstract
Do elementary statistics or equilibrium theory deliver any rules of thumb regarding how we
should argue in debates? We suggest a framework for normative analysis of debates.
In our framework, each discussant wants the audience to believe that the actual state coin-
cides with the discussant’s favorite state. We show that if the discussants’ payoﬀ functions in
the audience’s posterior are concave above the prior, convex below the prior, and exhibit some
form of loss aversion, then the discussant who begins the debate should ﬁrst present weaker ar-
guments rather than stronger arguments, and the discussant who speaks second should respond
with weak arguments to weak arguments, and with strong arguments to strong arguments.
We derive similar rules of thumb regarding the choice between presenting evidence that is
independent of the opponent’s evidence versus presenting evidence that is potentially correlated.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The way we argue is important for achieving our goals in a debate. After every debate in presidential
or parliamentary elections, we often ask who “won” the debate. Other examples abound, ranging
from deliberation contests in colleges to our everyday experience. Everyone who engages in a public
debate faces the problem of how to persuade eﬀectively: Which points to raise and in which order?
Which of them to emphasize and which of them to disregard? How to respond to the points raised
by opponents?
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Traditional models of communication, such as Crawford and Sobel (1982), focus on information
transmission and do not discuss how the agents argue and what constitute good deliberation skills.
Indeed, these issues seem to be complex. Deliberation depends on what the discussants know about
the audience and the opponents, as well as on the discussants’ experience acquired in the process of
learning by doing. Discussants may also attempt to sway the audience by stirring emotions and by
taking advantage of other psychological eﬀects.
In this paper, we propose a normative framework which assumes away the psychological side of
debates. Our goal is to see whether formal models, based on Bayes’ rule and equilibrium concepts,
deliver any rules of thumb regarding the way we should argue in debates.
The optimal way to persuade is very much driven by the audience’s expectations. Indeed, suppose
that we plan to make a certain point or present a certain piece of evidence, but the audience expects
us to comment on another aspect, or presenting another piece of evidence. Then, when we make the
point as intended, the audience may begin to think that we have little to say on the other aspect, or
we lack the evidence they anticipated us to reveal, thus undermining the force of our argument. So,
how eﬀective a point really is depends on what we lose by not following the audience’s expectation.
It is largely an empirical question what an audience’s expectations are in a particular situation.
Based on our theoretical study, we are able to say little about them. But we are able to say
more about what the discussants want these expectations to be. We take the perspective that the
discussants can shape the audience’s expectations, or build reputation for arguing (presenting their
evidence) in a certain manner. So, the question addressed in this paper is what reputation the
discussants may, or should want to build. In this sense, the analysis is more applicable to repeated
than to one-shot interactions.
More precisely, we study a model with two discussants and an audience. The discussants have
conﬂicting objectives: each of them wants to convince the audience that the state of the world is the
one she likes most, independent of the actual state. Each discussant has a ﬁnite number of pieces
of hard evidence. Discussants move sequentially, and each of them can reveal at most one piece of
evidence at a time. A positive probability of termination makes it possible that discussants will not
manage to reveal all the evidence they have. Therefore, the order in which they reveal their evidence
is important. Each discussant can commit to a strategy, i.e., which piece of evidence she will reveal,
contingent on the evidence she has and the evidence that has been revealed earlier.
We restrict attention to situations in which each discussant has at most two pieces of hard
evidence and the debate terminates after each di s c u s s a n tp r e s e n t sa tm o s to n ep i e c e . W em a k e
2this simplifying assumption partly for tractability. More importantly, it allows us to minimize the
controversies regarding the predictive power of equilibrium analysis since we will study only simple
games. Indeed, the optimal strategy of the discussant who moves second, called the follower,i s
derived from Bayes’ rule, and deriving the optimal strategy of the discussant who moves ﬁrst, called
the leader, in addition require predicting the response of the follower.
Within this simple model, we address two questions. Should discussants always present their
strongest evidence ﬁrst? And should they lean towards presenting the evidence that is independent
or the evidence that is correlated with the potential evidence of their opponents?
The answers depend on the discussants’ payoﬀs, which are functions of the audience’s posterior
belief. For example, suppose the follower’s payoﬀ function is concave above the audience’s prior
belief, convex below the prior and exhibits loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Then the
follower should respond with weaker evidence to weaker evidence presented by the leader, and with
stronger evidence to stronger evidence. If the leader’s payoﬀ function is also concave above the prior,
convex below the prior and exhibits loss aversion (call this the Kahneman and Tversky preference),
then she should begin arguing with weaker evidence.
As to whether the discussants should present independent or correlated evidence, we ﬁnd that if
the players have Kahneman and Tversky preferences, then the follower should respond with evidence
correlated with what was presented by the leader if the leader’s strategy is to present potentially cor-
related evidence ﬁrst. On the other hand, the follower should lean towards presenting independent
evidence if the leader’s strategy is to avoid presenting potentially correlated evidence. Anticipat-
ing this response, the leader prefers presenting independent evidence ﬁrst, at least over presenting
evidence that is highly correlated with the evidence of the follower.
Related literature
Earlier work on persuasion games focuses on characterizing conditions under which self-interested
parties reveal or fail to reveal all of the veriﬁable information they have (for example, Milgrom, 1981;
Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; and Shin, 1994). We instead consider situations in which the discussants
are constrained to reveal a limited amount of evidence, and try to characterize how the discussants
should argue.
One inspiration for our paper is the recent work of Glazer and Rubinstein (2001, 2004, 2006).
These authors are also interested in optimal rules of persuasion. However, they view a debate
as a mechanism by which an uninformed decision maker extracts information from the informed
discussants. We restrict attention to a particular game form, one that in our opinion resembles most
3debates, but allow players to commit to their debate strategies (or to build reputation for debating
in a particular manner).
Slightly more remotely related are papers by Dziuda (2007), Gentzkow and Kamenica (2009),
Olszewski (2004), and Sher (2008, 2009). These papers also study the choice of arguments or
questions in the context of persuasion or eliciting information from self-interested parties. One
aspect in Gentzkow and Kamenica (2010) that is similar to our paper is the importance of the
curvature of the sender’s utility in the receiver’s belief, but the two paper study diﬀerent models (our
model has two adversarial sides engaging in debate whereas there is a single sender in Gentzkow and
Kamenica) and address diﬀerent questions (we are interested in ﬁnding the best way to argue given
an information structure whereas Gentzkow and Kamenica ﬁnd the optimal information structure
for a sender who tries to persuade a receiver).
2B a s i c M o d e l
There are two (a priori) equally likely states of the world,  =  or ; two agents (discussants),
 and ,1 and an audience. The agents argue in front of the audience that the state is  or ,
respectively. Each agent is equipped with at most two signals, or pieces of “hard” evidence, in favor
of her claim:  and ,w h e r e =  or . Agents move sequentially, presenting one argument at
a time. Agent  (the leader) moves ﬁrst, presenting one piece of evidence available to her (if she
has any) according to her choice; agent  (the follower) moves second, also presenting one piece
of evidence (if she has any) according to her choice. We assume that the discussion ends here.2
The agents are not allowed to be silent when they have an argument. That is, whenever an agent
presents no evidence in favor of her claim, it is interpreted as the complete lack of arguments. This
assumption simpliﬁes the analysis and we believe that allowing for strategic hiding of signals would
not aﬀect any of our results.
The audience forms a posterior belief  about the state of the world. This belief is contingent
on the presented arguments, and the strategies of the two agents which the audience correctly
anticipates. The agents’ preferences are monotonic functions of the audience’s posterior. That is,
the utility of agent ,d e n o t e db y, is an increasing function of the probability assigned by belief 
1We use the pronoun “she” for player  and “he” for player .
2The results would not be aﬀected if we assumed that the discussion ends only with a positive probability, and
with the complementary probability the agents who has two pieces of evidence would have a chance to present the
second piece.
4to state , denoted by , and the utility of agent , denoted by , is an increasing function of the
probability assigned by belief  to state , denoted by . This approach is inspired by Geanakoplos,
Pearce and Stacchetti (1989). Agents are expected-utility maximizers.
One may argue that the agents’ utility should depend only indirectly on the audience’s beliefs,
through the audience’s actions. One example of a utility function  ( = ) derived from actions
is given by:  ()=( )
3 +3( )
2 (1 − ). This arises in a situation when the audience consists
of three members who have private information on their thresholds for choosing one alternative over
the other and the outcome is determined by majority voting.
Indeed, suppose a member votes for alternative  if and only if she believes the probability
that the state is  exceeds the threshold  and the agents’ prior over each member’s threshold  is
uniformly distributed on [01] and independent of the others’ thresholds. Then, for agent ,w h e n
the posterior that the state is  is , the probability that alternative  is chosen by the three-
member audience is ()
3 +3( )
2 (1 − ). If agent ’s utility is linear in the probability that 
is chosen, then we can represent it by  ()=( )
3 +3( )
2 (1 − ). Note that it is convex on
[012] and concave on [121].3 (Because of symmetry,  has a similar utility function.)
However, the way in which a debate aﬀects actions in many settings (e.g., political debates) is
diﬃcult to determine, even though the discussants often seem to focus on “winning the debate,”
assuming that this will have desirable impact on the audience’s actions. Our model can be viewed
as the reduced form of a model in which the members of the audience take actions after the debate.
2.1 Information Structure
The following table exhibits the prior distribution over signals: , ,c o n t i n g e n to n = .
3More generally, if the audience consists of an odd number of  members and they vote by majority rule, then
the utility function is  ()=

=0 +1
2

 ()− (1 − ). It is straightforward, although somewhat tedious
(and hence omitted), to show that this function is convex on [012] and concave on [121].
5where 0 12,a n d0 ≤ 1. The prior is symmetric contingent on  = .T h a t i s , i f t h e
state is , then it is more likely that agent  has signal  (which in the table is denoted simply by
) but agent  does not have signal  ( t h i si sd e n o t e db y¬) than that agent  does not have
signal  but agent  has signal .A n di f 6=0 , signals  and ¬ are (positively) correlated
conditionally on the state of the world. Contingent on the state being , the odds that agent  has
signal  are , but contingent in addition on agent  having signal ,t h e ya r e(1 − ).
Agent  =  or  obtains signal  with probability 1 − ,w h e r e ≤ 12,c o n t i n g e n to n = ,
and she obtains  only with probability ,c o n t i n g e n to n 6= . Signals  and  are conditionally
independent, and they are conditionally independent of signals  and .
The model easily generalizes to any ﬁnite number of agents, any ﬁnite number of signals, and more
general prior probability distributions over signals. We believe that this extension is a promising
subject for future research. However, this simpler version of the model will be suﬃcient for our
analysis.
2.2 Strategies and Equilibria
Each agent  has only one decision to make: whether to present  or , when she has both signals
at hand. Agent ’s decision may depend on the signal that has been revealed by agent  (or the
lack thereof).
We assume that agents can precommit to their strategies. In equilibrium, the strategy of the
leader must be a best response to the strategy of the follower, and the action of the follower,
contingent on each information node (i.e., contingent on , , or no signal having been revealed)
must be optimal, given the strategy of the leader. For simplicity, we restrict attention to pure
strategies. In Appendix A, we show that many of the results extend to the case when agents are
allowed to be playing mixed strategies.4
The commitment assumption can be motivated on the grounds of reputation eﬀects. Agents can
build reputation for arguing in a speciﬁc manner, or revealing their arguments in a speciﬁco r d e r .
We refer to reputation eﬀects in the intuitive, informal sense, rather than to any speciﬁc, existing
model. However, we conjecture that our model can be viewed as a reduced form of the following
repeated game:
Suppose that agents  and  are long-run players who play repeatedly against a sequence of
4Intuitively, mixed strategies seem relevant. One can, for strategic reasons, pretend to be skeptical about strategic
arguing in debates, making the pose of revealing arguments in random order.
6short-run audiences. At the end of each period, the audiences observe the arguments each agent had
in that period. Suppose that the repeated game is one of incomplete information, in which for each
pure strategy of each player, there is a small but positive probability of a commitment type who
plays this strategy. With the complementary probability, the agents are strategic. Finally, there is
a large population (a continuum) of agents  and a large population of agents , and every period
the members of the two populations are matched randomly.
Another motivation for the commitment assumption is costly information acquisition. Imagine
that agents must acquire signals, just before presenting them. The cost of acquiring one signal is
negligible, but the cost of acquiring any additional signal is prohibitively large. There is a chance
that an agent  searching for signal  or  will fail, i.e., signal ¬ or ¬, respectively, will be
obtained. The audience observes which signal each agent tries to acquire as well as the evidence
presented. In Appendix C, we show that the results in this alternative model of costly information
acquisition are similar to the results presented in the main text.5
3A d v i c e f o r t h e F o l l o w e r
3.1 Always Respond with your Strongest Argument?
Our ﬁrst application within the simple persuasion model addresses the following question: Should
the follower respond with weak arguments to weak arguments, and with strong arguments to strong
arguments? Or, should she always respond with her strongest argument? For example, suppose the
opponent gives an argument that does not sound convincing. Should one counterargue (or build
a reputation for counterarguing) decisively, or rather disregard the opponent’s argument, trying to
make the impression that she could give a powerful response, but does not want to get involved in
a discussion of low quality?
Formally, suppose that  =0 ,a n d=1 2. That is, there is no conditional correlation
between diﬀerent arguments, and arguments  and  are stronger, i.e., more informative about
the state of the world, than arguments  and . For simplicity, we assume that  and  convey
no information about the state of the world. (In Appendix B, we extend the model to incorporate
the case that the weaker signal is also informative, i.e., 12.)
5Notice, however, that the two models are not equivalent. For example, agent  who has both signals  and ,
and contemplates which signal to reveal, has diﬀerent information regarding agent ’s signals than agent  who is
deciding which signal to search for.
7Suppose ﬁrst that the leader’s strategy is to present the weak signal when she has both and
she brings the weak piece of evidence  in favor of her claim. The following table exhibits ,t h e
posterior belief of the audience that  =  under each strategy of the follower, given the signals at
the follower’s disposal:
only  only  both  & 
str.   =1 2  =1−   =1 2
str.   =   =1−   =1− 
18 18 18
Table 1. The leader who plays the strategy to present  when having both, presented .
The columns correspond to the events that the follower has: only signal , only signal ,a n d
both  and , respectively. The event that the follower has no signal is not included because the
followers strategy is irrelevant for the audience’s posterior contingent on this event. The ﬁrst two
rows correspond to the two strategies of the follower: str.  is an abbreviation for the strategy of
presenting  when he has both signals and str.  is an abbreviation for the strategy of presenting
 when he has both signals. The last row exhibits the ex ante probability of each event.
We call a function  :[ 0 1] →  concave at 12 if
1
2

µ
1
2
+ 
¶
+
1
2

µ
1
2
− 
¶
≤ 
µ
1
2
¶
, for every  ∈ (012];
and convex at 12 if
1
2

µ
1
2
+ 
¶
+
1
2

µ
1
2
− 
¶
≥ 
µ
1
2
¶
, for every  ∈ (012].
Proposition 1. (i) Suppose the leader plays the strategy of presenting the weaker signal in the
case of having both signals. If the follower’s utility is concave at 12, she should respond with the
weak signal to the weak signal. If the follower’s utility is convex at 12, she should respond with the
strong signal to the weak signal.
Proof. The only two events in which the follower obtains diﬀerent utilities under diﬀerent
strategies are when she has only signal , and when she has both signals  and .C o n t i n g e n t
on the union of the two events, the follower’s expected utility is
1
2
()+
1
2
(1 − ),
8when she plays the strategy of responding with the stronger signal, and
(12),
when she plays the strategy of responding with the weaker signal. Since 2+( 1− )2=1 2,t h e
concavity (convexity) of  makes the former expression larger (smaller) than the latter expression.¥
The proof of Proposition 1 is straightforward. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd it helpful to explain the
argument verbally and intuitively. Notice ﬁrst that the process of information revelation has the
following (general) martingale property: the audience’s belief regarding the state of the world, at
any point in time, is determined by the strategies of players that have already moved and the signals
that have been revealed, and are independent of the strategies of the players who will move in the
future.
Thus, the follower’s strategy does not aﬀect the expected beliefs of the audience, and aﬀects
only the dispersion of the beliefs. This dispersion is higher when the follower plays the strategy
of responding with a strong signal, because when she presents a strong signal the audience gets
convinced that the state is , but when she presents a weak signal, the audience infers that she lacks
a strong signal, and gets convinced that the state is . When the follower plays the strategy of
responding with a weak signal, the audience does not infer much about the state when this weak
signal is presented, so less dispersion is observed.
Similarly, we obtain the tables exhibiting , the posterior belief of the audience that  =  under
each strategy of the follower, contingent on other strategies and signals revealed by the leader:
only  only  both & 
str.   =1−   =
(1 − )2
(1 − )2 + 2  =1− 
str.   =1 2  =
(1 − )2
(1 − )2 + 2  =
(1 − )2
(1 − )2 + 2
(1 − )
4
(1 − )2
8
+
2
8
(1 − )2
8
+
2
8
Table 2. The leader who plays the strategy to present  when having both, presented .
9only  only  both  & 
str.   =   =1 2  = 
str.   =
2
(1 − )2 + 2  =1 2  =1 2
(1 − )2
4
+
2
4
(1 − )
2
(1 − )
2
Table 3. The leader who plays the strategy to present  when having both, presented .
We omit the table for the case in which the leader plays the strategy to present  when having
both signals and has presented signal .T h i sb e c a u s ef o r =1 2, the entries in the ﬁrst two rows
of this table are the same as those in Table 3 and the entries in the third row of this table is equal
to those in Table 3 multiplied by 12.
Proposition 1 (continued). (ii) Suppose the leader plays the strategy of presenting the stronger
signal in the case of having both signals. If the follower’s utility is concave on [121],s h es h o u l d
respond with the weak signal to the weak signal. If the follower’s utility is convex on [121],s h e
should respond with the strong signal to the weak signal.
(iii) Independent of the leader’s strategy: if the follower’s utility is concave on [012],s h es h o u l d
respond with the weak signal to the strong signal; and if the follower’s utility is convex on [012],
she should respond with the strong signal to the strong signal.
The proof and intuition are similar to that for part (i), and so will be omitted.
Since our results, and therefore the advice for the follower, depends on concavity or convexity of
her utility function, one would like to know which properties seem to be a better modelling choice.
The answer to this question depends, of course, on the way the audience uses the information
conveyed by the discussants, or in other words, on the subsequent actions of the audience.
Nevertheless, we conjecture that in many situations of interest the utility functions may be
concave on the interval [121], convex on the interval [012], and have a kink, so that they are
concave at 12. The example of the utility function  ()=( )
3 +3()
2 (1 − ) illustrates how
concavity on [121] and convexity on [012] arise naturally in some situations. This conjecture
is also supported by the intuition that the ﬁfty-ﬁfty belief is “pivotal” in certain applications, and
there seems to be a bigger diﬀerence between the posterior being equal to .49 and .51 than between
.01 and .03, or .97 and .99. Furthermore, given the ﬁfty-ﬁfty prior, the discussants may have some
form of loss aversion, analogous to that experimentally demonstrated by Kahneman and Tversky
10(1979). Figure 1 contains an example of a utility function with these properties.
Figure 1. The utility function ,d e p i c t e di nb o l d ,h a sak i n ka t12.
Under these assumptions on the utility function, the follower should respond by, or try to build
a reputation for, presenting weak arguments in response to weak arguments and presenting strong
arguments in response to strong arguments, independent of the leader’s strategy. It is especially
striking that the follower may want to develop a reputation of presenting weak argument as it is less
informative. Of course, in a one-shot interaction, responding with a weak argument in case of having
both arguments is not an equilibrium strategy without commitment. Even if the audience expects
the follower to present the weak argument, it is still better to present the strong argument when it
is available as it changes the audience’s posterior favorably (and the implicit inference that the weak
evidence is absent does not matter for posterior when  =1 2). In the less extreme case where ,
is lower than 12, it can be an equilibrium strategy to present the weaker argument even without
11commitment. As long as  is not too weak compared to , presenting the strong argument when
the audience expects the weaker one is damaging because the audience will infer that the weaker
evidence does not exist. In contrast, if the weaker argument is presented, the audience does not
draw any inference about whether the stronger evidence exists. (See Appendix B for details.)
3.2 Correlated Versus Independent Evidence
To illustrate the question we address in this section, recall the following problem discussed in Glazer
and Rubinstein (2001): Suppose you are trying to convince the audience that in most capital cities,
the level of education has risen recently. Your opponent brings hard evidence showing that the level
of education in Bangkok has fallen. Should you respond by bringing similar evidence showing that
the level of education has risen from Manila or similar evidence from Mexico City (or perhaps other
more distant cities)?
Glazer and Rubinstein argue, and they present evidence from questionnaires, that most peo-
ple would recommend bringing the evidence from Manila, which seems more similar or related to
Bangkok. Similarly, most people would recommend bringing the evidence from Brussels to counter
the evidence from Amsterdam. Glazer and Rubinstein also argue that this phenomenon is not
conﬁned to cases in which people have implicit beliefs about some correlation between arguments.
Although we believe that correlation between arguments plays an important role in debates, the
results of this section show that an explanation of Glazer and Rubinstein’s experiment based on cor-
relation pattern is not as straightforward as one might expect, and it requires several qualiﬁcations.
Suppose ﬁrst that the leader’s strategy is to present signal  when she has both and she brings
evidence  in favor of her claim. The following table exhibits the posterior belief of the audience,
, under each strategy of the follower, given the signals at the follower’s disposal. (Again, we
omit the event that the follower has no evidence because the follower’s strategy does not aﬀect the
posterior in this case.)
only  only  both  & 
str. 
1
2
£
2 + (1 − )
¤
(1 − )
[2 + (1 − )](1 − )+[ ( 1− )2 + (1 − )]
1
2
str.  
(1 − )
(1 − ) + (1 − )
(1 − )
(1 − ) + (1 − )
1
2(1 − )(1 − ) 1
2
£
(1 − )2 + (1 − )
¤
 + 1
2
£
2 + (1 − )
¤
(1 − ) 1
2(1 − )(1 − )
Table 4. The leader who plays the strategy to present  when having both, presented 
12Suppose that  6=0 ,a n d = 12. That is, arguments  and ¬ are conditionally
correlated, but any single argument is equally informative about the state of the world.
Proposition 2. (i) Suppose the leader plays the strategy of presenting signal  i nt h ec a s eo f
having both signals, and presents signal . Then, the follower should respond with signal  when
having both signals if his utility function is concave on [012];a n dthe follower should respond with
signal  when having both signals if his utility function is convex on [012].
Proof. By the martingale property of the process of information revelation, or by direct com-
putations, the expected posterior beliefs are equal under the two strategies of the follower,
str.  ()=str.  ().
Thus, the proposition follows from the fact that for  =  we have
(1 − )
(1 − ) + (1 − )
=1 2
and £
2 + (1 − )
¤
(1 − )
[2 + (1 − )](1 − )+[ ( 1− )2 + (1 − )]
∈ (12).
¥
To understand this result, notice that when the leader who plays the strategy  (i.e., presenting
 in the case of having both signals) has presented signal , the audience’s posterior  can be
no higher than 12. If the follower plays strategy  () and presents the signal  (), then 
is equal to 12. But if the follower plays strategy  () but presents the signal  (), then 
is lower than 12. Because  and ¬ are positively correlated,  is higher if the follower plays
strategy  but presents the signal  than if the follower plays strategy  but presents the signal
. So, there is more dispersion in the audience’s belief if the follower plays the strategy  than if
he plays strategy . Hence he is better oﬀ playing strategy  if his utility function is convex on
[012] and he is better oﬀ playing strategy  if his utility function is concave on [012].
Similarly, we can derive the optimal strategy for the follower, contingent on the other strategy
and the signals revealed by the leader. To do this, we obtain the following tables exhibiting the
posteriors of the audience  for diﬀerent strategies and signals of the follower and the leader.
13Let
 =
1
2

2 £
(1 − )2 + (1 − )
¤
+
1
2
(1 − )2 £
2 + (1 − )
¤
0 =
1
2
(1 − )[(1 − )2 + (1 − )] +
1
2
(1 − )
£
2 + (1 − )
¤
00 =
1
2
[
2 +( 1− )2](1 − )(1 − )
and
1 =
[(1 − )2 + (1 − )]
[(1 − )2 + (1 − )] + (1 − )[2 + (1 − )]
2 =

2[(1 − )2 + (1 − )]

2[(1 − )2 + (1 − )] + (1 − )2 [2 + (1 − )]
.
only  only  both  & 
str.  1 −  1 − 2 1 − 
str. 
1
2
(1 − )2
(1 − )2 + 
2(1 − )
(1 − )2
(1 − )2 + 
2(1 − )
(1 − )(1 − )(1 − )  00
Table 5. The leader who plays the strategy to present  when having both, presented .
only  only  both  & 
str. 
(1 − )
(1 − )+( 1− )

(1 − )
(1 − )+( 1− )
str. 

2(1 − )

2(1 − )+( 1− )2
1
2
1
2
1
2
(1 − )
1
2
(1 − )
1
2
(1 − )
Table 6. The leader who plays the strategy to present  when having both, presented 
only  only  both  & 
str.  1 12 1
str.  2 1 −  1 − 
 (1 − )(1 − )(1 − ) 0
Table 7. The leader who plays the strategy to present  when having both, presented .
Proposition 2 (continued). (ii) Suppose the leader plays the strategy of presenting signal 
when having both signals, and presents signal . Then, the follower should respond with signal
14 when having both signals if her utility function is concave on [121]; and the follower should
respond with signal  when having both signals if her utility function is convex on [121].
(iii) Suppose the leader plays the strategy of presenting signal  when having both signals, and
presents signal .T h e n ,t h ef o l l o w e ri si n d i ﬀerent between the two possible strategies.
(iv) Suppose the leader plays the strategy of presenting signal  when of having both signals,
and presents signal . Then, the follower should respond with signal  when having both signals if
her utility function is concave on [121] and concave at 12, and the follower should respond with
signal  when having both signals if her utility function is convex on [121] and convex at 12.
Proof. In order to obtain part (ii), notice that when  =  the entries in Table 5 become
(1 − )2
(1 − )2 + 
2(1 − )
=1− 
and
1 − 2 =
(1 − )2[2 + (1 − )]
(1 − )2[2 + (1 − )] + 
2[(1 − )2 + (1 − )]
=
(1 − )[ + (1 − )]
(1 − )[ + (1 − )] + [(1 − )+]
∈ (121 − ).
This together with the property that
str.  ()=str.  ()
yield (ii).
Part (iii) follows immediately from Table 6 for  = .
In order to obtain part (iv), notice that when  = , the entries in Table 7 become
1 =
[(1 − )2 + (1 − )]
[(1 − )2 + (1 − )] + (1 − )[2 + (1 − )]
=
1 −  + 
1+
∈ (121 − )
and
2 =

2[(1 − )2 + (1 − )]

2[(1 − )2 + (1 − )] + (1 − )2 [2 + (1 − )]
=
(1 − )+2
2(1 − )+[(1 − )2 + 2]
 12.
Recall that
15str.  ()=str.  ().
So we compare two lotteries.6 The lottery generated by strategy  has outcomes 12 and 1;
and the lottery generated by strategy  has outcomes 2 and 3 =1− ,w h e r e
2  12  1  3.
We believe that a graphical argument is the simplest. This argument is illustrated in Figure
2. By concavity of the utility function on [121], the line passing through (12 (12)) and
(1 (1)) is steeper than the line passing through (12 (12)) and (3 (3)).B yc o n c a v i t y
at 12, the line passing through (2 (2)) and (12 (12)) is steeper than the line passing
through (12 (12)) and (1 − 2 (1 − 2)).
Direct calculations show that
1 − 2  3.
Thus, by concavity on [121], the line passing through (2 (2)) and (12 (12)) is steeper
than the line passing through (12 (12)) and (3 (3)).
If (2 (2)) belonged to the line passing through (12 (12)) and (3 (3)),t h e n((),
str.  ()) would belong to that line as well. However, since the line passing through (2 (2))
and (12 (12)) is steeper than the line passing though (12 (12)) and (3 (3)),i tm u s t
b et h ec a s et h a t((), str.  ()) lies below the line passing through (12 (12)) and
(3 (3)).
On the other hand, ((), str.  ()) lies above the line passing through (12 (12))
and (3 (3)), because it belongs to the steeper line passing through (12 (12)) and (1 (1)).
This yields that
str.  () ≤ str.  ().
¥
6Strictly speaking these are not lotteries because the ex ante probabilities do not add up to 1, but a simple
normalization transforms these into lotteries and the argument is not aﬀected. For expositional convenience, we call
them lotteries here and in the proofs of other propositions as well.
16Figure 2. The line passing through (2 (2)) and (12 (12)) is steeper
than the line passing through (12 (12)) and (1 − 2 (1 − 2)),w h i c hi nt u r n
is steeper than the line passing through (12 (12)) and (3 (3)).
Also, the line passing through (12 (12)) and (1 (1)) is steeper than
the line passing through (12 (12)) and (3 (3)).
The intuition for part (ii) is similar to that for part (i): if the leader plays the strategy  but
presents signal , then the audience’s posterior  is at least 12 as long as the follower shows some
evidence. If the follower’s strategy is ,t h ep o s t e r i o r is above 12 if she presents  and it is
17equal to 12 if she presents . If the follower’s strategy is ,t h ep o s t e r i o r is above 12 if she
presents  and it is still above 12 even when she presents . T h i si sb e c a u s e and ¬ are
positively correlated. Since the leader already reveals that she has evidence  but no ,e v e ni f
the follower reveals that she only has evidence  and does not have evidence , the audience’s
posterior is still above 12. In short, because  and ¬ are positively correlated, the follower’s
strategy  induces a lower dispersion in the audience’s belief, and hence it is the optimal strategy
if her utility function is concave on [121], while the strategy  is optimal if her utility function is
convex on [121].
Part (iii) is straightforward: if the leader’s strategy is to present the conditionally independent
signal  in case she has both and she presents , then the distribution of posteriors is the same
no matter what strategy the follower plays.
Part (iv) deals with the optimal strategy for the follower if the leader plays the strategy 
but presents signal , i.e., the leader reveals that she has evidence , but not .I ft h ef o l l o w e r
responds with strategy , then the posterior  is higher than 12 if she presents  and is equal
to 12 if she presents . If the follower responds with strategy , then the posterior  is higher
than 12 if she presents , but it is lower than 12 if she presents . Because of the positive
correlation between ¬ and , the revelation that the follower has  but no  does not sway
the posterior favorably enough for it to exceed 12. So if the follower’s utility exhibits loss aversion
at 12 and concavity on [121], then she should play the strategy . Similarly, if the follower’s
utility is convex at 12 and convex on [121], then she should play the strategy .
Although in deriving the results we have assumed commitment to strategies, we would like to
point out that the strategies we have identiﬁed for the follower are equilibrium strategies even
without commitment. For example, if the audience expects that the follower will respond to the
leader’s signal  with strategy , then indeed the follower should optimally choose the strategy
, because with this expectation the audience believes that the follower does not have signal 
when  is revealed but believes that the follower may also have  when  is revealed.
4A d v i c e f o r t h e L e a d e r
4.1 Always Raise Your Strongest Argument?
We now turn to the problem of the leader. What argument should the leader raise in anticipation of
the follower’s response? In particular, is it always wise for the leader to raise her strongest argument?
18In the following analysis, we make the same assumptions as in section 3.1, i.e.,  =0and
= 1
2. We also assume that the follower’s utility function is convex on [012] and concave on
[121] and it is concave at 12. (Similar results can be derived if we make alternative assumptions
on the convexity or concavity of the players’ utility functions.) Then, according to Proposition 1,
the follower responds with a weak signal to a weak signal, and responds with a strong signal to a
strong signal.
The following table exhibits the follower’s response to each strategy of the leader, given the
signals at the leader’s disposal. We omit the case in which the leader has only  because according
to Proposition 1 (iii), the follower’s best response is independent of the leader’s strategy in this case
and therefore the resulting distributions of posteriors are the same under the diﬀerent strategies
of the leader. We also omit the case in which the leader had neither  or  again because the
resulting distributions of posteriors are the same under the diﬀerent strategies of the leader.
only  both  & 
str.  follower responds with str. ,s e eT a b l e10 follower responds with str. ,s e eT a b l e10
str.  follower responds with str. ,s e eT a b l e20 follower responds with str. ,s e eT a b l e30
.
Tables 1020 and 30 below exhibit , the audience’s posterior that  = , contingent on the
strategies and signals of the leader and incorporating the response of the follower. They contain the
relevant rows from Tables 1, 2 and 3.
only  only  both  &  neither  nor 
str.   =1 2  =   =1 2  =1− 
18 18 18 18
Table 10. The leader who plays strategy  has either  or both  and .
So she presents  a n dt h ef o l l o w e rr e s p o n d sw i t hs t r a t e g y.
only  only  both  &  neither  nor 
str.   =   =
2
(1 − )2 + 2  =   =1 2
(1 − )
4
(1 − )2
8
+
2
8
(1 − )2
8
+
2
8
(1 − )
4
.
Table 20. The leader who plays strategy  has only . So she presents
signal  and the follower responds with strategy .
19only  only  both  &  neither  or 
str.   =
(1 − )2
(1 − )2 + 2  =1 2  =1 2  =
(1 − )2
(1 − )2 + 2
(1 − )2
8
+
2
8
(1 − )
4
(1 − )
4
(1 − )2
8
+
2
8
Table 30. The leader who plays strategy  has both  and .
So she present  and the follower responds with strategy .
(The last row in Tables 10−30 shows the ex ante probabilities of the events, and it is equal to the
last row of Table 1-3, respectively, except in Table 30 where it is multiplied by 12 because Table 3
contains also the event that the leader has only .)
Proposition 3. Suppose both players’ utility functions are convex on [012],c o n c a v eo n[121]
and concave at 12. Then the leader should play strategy , i.e., present the weak signal  when
she has both signals.
Proof. Since the distributions of posteriors are the same in the event “the leader only has ”
and the event “the leader has neither  nor ,” we only need to consider the events “the leader
only has ” and the event “the leader has both  and .”
To prove the proposition, we need to show that
1
8
 ()+
1
4
 (12) +
1
8
 (1 − )
≥
Ã
(1 − )
4
+
(1 − )
2 + 2
8
!
 ()+
(1 − )
2 + 2
8

Ã
2
(1 − )
2 + 2
!
+
+
3(1 − )
4
 (12) +
(1 − )
2 + 2
4

Ã
(1 − )
2
(1 − )
2 + 2
!
.
Since
(1−)
4 +
(1−)2+2
8 = 1
8, we only need to show that
1
4
 (12) +
1
8
 (1 − )
≥
(1 − )
2 + 2
8

Ã
2
(1 − )
2 + 2
!
+
3(1 − )
4
 (12) +
(1 − )
2 + 2
4

Ã
(1 − )
2
(1 − )
2 + 2
!
.
Concavity of  at 12 implies that
(1 − )
2 + 2
8

Ã
2
(1 − )
2 + 2
!
+
(1 − )
2 + 2
8

Ã
(1 − )
2
(1 − )
2 + 2
!
≤
(1 − )
2 + 2
4
 (12).
20Since 12  (1 − ) 
(1−)2
(1−)2+2, concavity of  on [121] implies that
³
(1 − )
2 + 2
´
8

Ã
(1 − )
2
(1 − )
2 + 2
!
+
(2(1 − ))
8
 (12) ≤
1
8
 (1 − ).
Hence
(1 − )
2 + 2
8

Ã
2
(1 − )
2 + 2
!
+
3(1 − )
4
 (12) +
(1 − )
2 + 2
4

Ã
(1 − )
2
(1 − )
2 + 2
!
≤
Ã
(1 − )
2 + 2
4
+
(1 − )
2
!
 (12) +
1
8
 (1 − )=
1
4
 (12) +
1
8
 (1 − ).
So the leader should play strategy .¥
To gain some intuition for this result, note that there are two events in which the leader’s strategy
matters: the leader only has the weak signal; the leader has both the weak and the strong signals.
If the leader plays the strategy of presenting the weak signal when she has both, then in either one
of these two events, she presents the weak signal and the follower responds with the weak strategy,
i.e., presenting the weak signal when he has both. So,  =1 2 if the follower presents a weak signal,
 =  if the follower presents a strong signal, and  =( 1− ) if the follower presents neither.
If the leader plays the strategy of presenting the strong signal when she has both, then the
follower’s strategy depends on whether the leader reveals the strong signal or the weak signal.
In particular, if the leader reveals the strong signal, then the follower responds with the strong
strategy, i.e., presenting the strong signal when he has both. The posterior is  =1 2 if the follower
presents a strong signal. If the follower fails to present a strong signal,  is above 12;i nf a c t ,
in this case is higher than (1 − ), because there are now two informative signals in favor of state .
If the leader reveals the weak signal, then the follower responds with a weak strategy, i.e.,
presenting the weak signal when he has both. The posterior  is equal to  if the follower presents
a weak signal, is lower than  if the follower presents a strong signal, and is equal to 12 if the
follower presents neither signal.
To summarize, if the leader plays the strong strategy, the posteriors induced have more dispersion
on [121] and also around 12 than if she plays the weak strategy. So if the leader’s utility function
is concave on [121] and concave at 12, she should play the weak strategy.
214.2 Correlated or Independent Evidence?
From Proposition 2, we have the following table that summarizes the follower’s best response con-
tingent on the leader’s strategy and the signal that has been presented.
only  both  and  only 
str.  follower responds with str.  follower responds with str.  follower responds with str. 
str.  follower responds with str.  follower is indiﬀerent follower is indiﬀerent
Recall that
1 =
[(1 − )2 + (1 − )]
[(1 − )2 + (1 − )] + (1 − )[2 + (1 − )]
2 =

2[(1 − )2 + (1 − )]

2[(1 − )2 + (1 − )] + (1 − )2 [2 + (1 − )]
.
Let
3 =
(1 − )
2 + (1 − )
(1 − )
2 +2 (1 − )+2
4 =
³
(1 − )
2 + (1 − )
´
(1 − )
³
(1 − )
2 + (1 − )
´
(1 − )+( 2 + (1 − ))
.
Tables 4050, 60 and 70 below exhibit the audience’s posterior . They contain the relevant rows
from Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7.
only  only  both  &  neither  or 
str.  1 − 
 (1 − )
(1 − ) +( 1− )
(1 − )
(1 − ) +( 1− )
4
1
2
(1 − )(1 − )
1
2(1 − )2
+1
22 (1 − )+1
2(1 − )
1
2
(1 − )(1 − )
1
2 (1 − )
2 (1 − )
+1
22 + 1
2(1 − )
Table 40. The leader who plays the strategy  has either  or both  and .
So she presents  and the follower responds by strategy .
only  only  both  &  neither  nor 
str.   2  3
(1 − )(1 − )(1 − )  00 0
Table 50. The leader who plays the strategy  has only .
So she presents  a n dt h ef o l l o w e rr e s p o n d sw i t hs t r a t e g y.
22only  only  both  &  neither  nor 
str. 
(1 − )
(1 − )+( 1− )
1 − 
(1 − )
(1 − )+( 1− )
(1 − )
2 (1 − )
(1 − )
2 (1 − )+
2
1
2
(1 − )
1
2
(1 − )
1
2
(1 − )
1
2
(1 − )
2 (1 − )+
1
2

2
Table 60. The leader who plays the strategy  has either  or both  and .
So she presents  and the follower is indiﬀerent. Suppose she responds with .
only  only  both  &  neither  nor 
str.  1 − 1
1
2
1 − 1
(1 − )
2

2 +( 1− )
2
 (1 − )(1 − )(1 − ) 0 00
Table 70. The leader who plays the strategy  only has .
So she presents  and the follower responds by strategy .
Assume  = , as in section 3.2. In Table 8 and Table 9, we summarize the audience’s posterior 
induced by the leader’s strategies, incorporating the follower’s best responses, and the corresponding
ex ante probabilities.
str.  1 − 1
1
2
1 − 
(1 − )
2

2 +( 1− )
2 4
 + 0 (1 − )+
(1 − )
2 (1 − )
2
1
2
(1 − )(1 − ) 00
1
2 (1 − )
3 + 1
2
3
+1
2(1 − )
Table 8. The leader plays strategy .
str.   2
1
2
1 −  3
(1 − )
3
(1 − )
3 + 
3
(1 − )
2 (1 − )
2 + 00   (1 − )
1
2
 (1 − ) 0 1
2
³
(1 − )
3 + 
3
´
Table 9. The leader plays strategy .
We call a function  :[ 0 1] →  strictly concave at 12 if
1
2

µ
1
2
+ 
¶
+
1
2

µ
1
2
− 
¶

µ
1
2
¶
, for every  ∈ (012];
Proposition 4. Suppose both players’ utility functions are continuous on [01],c o n c a v eo n
[121] and strictly concave at 12. The leader should play strategy , i.e., present the independent
signal when she has both, if  is suﬃciently high.
23Proof. Decompose the lottery induced by each strategy into two: one corresponding to the
entries of the last two columns of Tables 8 and 9, and the other corresponding to the entries of the
ﬁrst three columns. Consider ﬁrst the lotteries corresponding to the entries of the last two columns.
Since
00
Ã
(1 − )
2

2 +( 1− )
2
!
+
1
2
³
(1 − )
3 + 
3 +  (1 − )
´
4 = 03+
µ
1
2
³
(1 − )
3 + 
3
´¶
(1 − )
3
(1 − )
3 + 
3,
these lotteries have the same mean.
Since 1
2  3 
(1−)2
2+(1−)2  4 
(1−)3
(1−)3+3 for  ∈ (01), it follows that if  is concave on
[121],t h e n
00
Ã
(1 − )
2

2 +( 1− )
2
!
+
1
2
³
(1 − )
3 + 
3 +  (1 − )
´
 (4) (1)
≥ 0 (3)+
(1 − )
3
(1 − )
3 + 
3
µ
1
2
³
(1 − )
3 + 
3
´¶
.
That is, for the last two columns of Tables 8 and 9, the leader prefers the lottery induced by
strategy  than that induced by strategy  if  is concave on [121].
The other columns of Tables 9 and 10 correspond to lotteries with mean 12,s i n c e
( + 0)(1− 1)+
µ
1
2
(1 − )(1 − )
¶
(1 − )=
µ
 + 0 +
1
2
(1 − ) (1 − )
¶
1
2
,
and
³
(1 − )
2 (1 − )
2 + 00
´
+2+
1
2
 (1 − )(1− )=
µ
(1 − )
2 (1 − )
2 + 00 +  +
1
2
 (1 − )
¶
1
2
.
So, whether the leader prefers strategy  over  depends also on her preference over the two
lotteries with mean 12. From inequality (1), we have
str.() − str.() ≥ ( + 0) (1 − 1)+
³
(1 − ) +( 1− )
2 (1 − )
2
´
 (12)
+
µ
1
2
(1 − )(1 − )
¶
 (1 − ) −
³
(1 − )
2 (1 − )
2 + 00
´
 ()
− (2) −  (1 − ) (12) −
1
2
 (1 − ) ((1 − ))
Since lim→1 1 = 1
2, lim→1 2 = , lim→1  = 1
2 (1 − ), lim→1 0 = 1
2 (1 − ), lim→1 00 =
0,  is continuous in ,a n d000 are continuous in ,w eh a v e
24lim
→1
¡
str.() − str.()
¢
≥
 (1 − ) (12) −
1
2
(1 − ) () −
1
2
 (1 − ) ((1 − )).
If  is strictly concave at 12,t h e n
 (1 − ) (12) −
1
2
 (1 − ) () −
1
2
 (1 − ) ((1 − ))  0.
Given the continuity of the leader’s payoﬀ in , the leader should play strategy  when  is
suﬃciently close to 1.¥
The proof shows that the leader’s preference over the two strategies depends on the concavity or
convexity of her utility function on [121], and her preference over the lotteries from the ﬁrst three
columns of Table 8 and Table 9, which have mean 12. However, it can be shown that her preference
over the two lotteries with mean 12 is in general not determined by the concavity or convexity of
the leader’s utility function at 12, and we are only able to establish the leader’s preference over
these two lotteries when the correlation between  and ¬ is suﬃciently high.
To gain some intuition for this result, let us take a closer look at the two pairs of lotteries in turn.
First, compare the lottery
³
3
(1−)3
(1−)3+3
´
induced by strategy  and the lottery
³
(1−)2
2+(1−)2 4
´
induced by strategy . The one induced by strategy  has more dispersion because (conditionally)
independent evidence in favor of the same state sways the audience belief more than (conditionally
and positively) correlated evidence. Because strategy  reveals independent evidence and strategy
 reveals correlated evidence, strategy  induces more extreme posteriors than strategy  when
the leader has favorable evidence and the follower has no evidence in his favor at all. So if the
leader’s payoﬀ is concave on [121], she prefers the lottery induced by strategy .
Next, compare the lotteries that have mean 12. It is perhaps easiest to understand the result
when  =1 ,i . e . , and ¬ are perfectly correlated. In this case, the lottery induced by strategy
 is degenerate, containing only posterior equal to 12 whereas the lottery induced by strategy 
contains posteriors both below and above 12. If the leader’s preference exhibits loss aversion, the
leader prefers the lottery induced by strategy . By continuity the result holds when  and 
are suﬃciently correlated.
We assumed strict concavity 12 for Proposition 4, but a similar result holds if we instead assume
strictly concavity on [121]. The following example illustrates this.
25Example 1: Suppose  = ,a n dt h ep a y o ﬀ function of player  is  ()=3
 +3 2
 (1 − )
and the payoﬀ function of player  is  ()=3
 +32
 (1 − ).S ob o t hp l a y e r s ’p a y o ﬀ functions
are strictly convex on [012] and strictly concave on [121].
Simple calculation shows that lim→1 1 = 1
2, lim→1 2 = ,
lim
→1
3 =
(1 − )
2 + (1 − )
(1 − )
2 +2  (1 − )+
2 =1− ,
lim
→1
4 =
³
(1 − )
2 + (1 − )
´
(1 − )
³
(1 − )
2 +  (1 − )
´
(1 − )+
¡

2 + (1 − )
¢

=
(1 − )
2
(1 − )
2 + 
2,
lim→1  = 1
2 (1 − ), lim→1 0 = 1
2 (1 − ), lim→1 00 =0 .S o a s  goes to 1, the leader’s
expected payoﬀ when playing strategy  is
lim
→1
str.()=2  (1 − ) (12) +
¡

2 −  +1 2
¢

Ã
(1 − )
2
(1 − )
2 + 
2
!
=  (1 − )+
¡

2 −  +1 2
¢¡
2
2 − 2 +1
¢−3
( − 1)
4 ¡
4
2 − 2 +1
¢
.
And the leader’s expected payoﬀ when playing strategy  is
lim
→1
str.()=
1
2
 (1 − ) ()+(1 − ) (12) +  (1 − ) (1 − )
+
1
2
³
(1 − )
3 + 
3
´

Ã
(1 − )
3
(1 − )
3 + 
3
!
=
1
2
(1 − )
¡
2
3 − 3
2 +3
¢
+
1
2
¡
3
2 − 3 +1
¢−2
( − 1)
6 ¡
3
2 − 3 +2 
3 +1
¢
The diﬀerence in the leader’s expected payoﬀ between strategy  and strategy  is
lim
→1
¡
str.() − str.()
¢
=
1
2
¡
2
2 − 2 +1
¢−2 ¡
3
2 − 3 +1
¢−2
(1 − )
3 (1 − 2)
3 ¡

2 −  +1
¢¡
8
2 − 8 +3
¢

3.
Since 12, 
2 −  +1=(  − 12)
2 +3 4  0, 8
2 − 8 +3=8(  − 12)
2 +1 0,w eh a v e
lim→1 (str.() − str.())  0. So if the correlation between the two pieces of evidence
is suﬃciently high, the leader should present signal  when she has both signals at her disposal.
¥
26Returning to the Glazer and Rubinstein’s (2001) experiment, it indeed follows from Propositions
2 (ii) and 4 that the follower should respond (or try to build the reputation for responding) with
signal  to signal , as the experimental evidence from Glazer and Rubinstein (2001) suggests,
at least when agents have preferences which are concave above the prior, convex below the prior,
exhibit some form of loss aversion, and the correlation coeﬃcient is high.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We provide a normative framework for the analysis of arguing in public debates. The discussant’s
payoﬀ depends on the audience’s posterior belief in his or her case. We focus on what we ﬁnd to be
t h em o s tr e a s o n a b l ec a s e :t h ep a y o ﬀ is concave above the prior, convex below the prior, and concave
at the prior. In this case, the model suggests that discussants should disregard arguments made
by their opponents that do not seem relevant or convincing, and respond with strong evidence to
strong evidence. Moreover, they should begin a debate with presenting weaker rather than stronger
evidence, although, as we show in Appendix B, these conclusions rely on the assumption that weak
evidence is suﬃciently week. The model also oﬀers an explanation of the experimental ﬁndings of
Glazer and Rubinstein (2001) based on the assumption that the correlation between the education
levels of neighboring or similar cities is high.
We have studied only two applications of persuasion in this paper, but the model provides a
framework for exploring other applications as well. One example is whether a discussant should
build a reputation for speaking ﬁrst or wait until the opponent has made an argument. Another
example is whether a discussant should build a reputation for presenting more standard versus more
original evidence. That is, if the probability of obtaining signals  and  is relatively low in both
states of the world; and the probability of obtaining signals  and  is higher in both states of the
world, should the discussant reveal the more standard evidence  or the more original evidence ?
276 Appendix A: Mixed Strategies
6.1 Weak versus Strong Evidence
We show that in the “weak vs. strong” case, our results generalize to mixed strategies, at least as
far as the payoﬀsa r ec o n c a v ea b o v e12,c o n v e xb e l o w12,a n dc o n c a v ea t12. Suppose that the
leader plays the strategy of presenting signal  with probability  and signal  with probability
1− when having both signals, and the follower plays the strategy of presenting  with probability
 and  with probability 1 −  when having both signals. Suppose the leader presented signal 
and the follower presented signal . This happens in state  with probability
[Pr(¬ | )+( 1− )Pr(  | )] · [Pr(¬ | )+( 1− )Pr(  | )]
=
∙
1
2
 +( 1− )
1
2
(1 − )
¸
·
∙
1
2
(1 − )+( 1− )
1
2

¸
,
and in state  with probability
[Pr(¬ | )+( 1− )Pr(  | )] · [Pr(¬ | )+( 1− )Pr(  | )]
=
∙
1
2
(1 − )+( 1− )
1
2

¸
·
∙
1
2
 +( 1− )
1
2
(1 − )
¸
.
Thus, the audience posterior that the state is , , when hearing  and  presented is
( )=
(1 − )(1 − (1 − ))
2 −  −  +2 (1 − )
.
Similarly,
( )=
(1 − )(1 − )
1 − 2(1 − )
.
The probability that the leader presents signal  and the follower has only signal  is
Pr(& only )=
1
2
Pr(& only  | )+
1
2
Pr(& only  | )
=
1
2
[Pr(¬ | )+( 1− )Pr(  | )] · Pr(¬ | )
+
1
2
[Pr(¬ | )+( 1− )Pr(  | )] · Pr(¬ | )
=
1
8
{1 − [2 +( 1− )2]}.
Similarly, the probability that the leader presents the signal  and the follower has only signal ,
and the probability that the leader presents the signal  and the follower has both signal  and
signal  are both equal to
1
8
[1 − 2(1 − )].
28Notice that the audience’s posterior  does not depend on  when the audience is presented
signals  and  and it is higher than 12 for any . When the audience is presented with signals
 and ,  decreases in  and it is higher than 12 when and lower than 12 when  .
By the concavity of the utility function on [121] and concavity at 12, the follower’s best response
must be either  =0or  =1 . Therefore, it is optimal to respond with weak signal to weak signal
by Proposition 1 (i) and (ii).
Suppose now that the leader has presented signal . If the follower presents signal ,t h e
audience posterior is ( )=1 2 independent of the strategies. When the audience is presented
with signals  and ,
( )=
(1 − (1 − ))
1 − 2(1 − )
,
which is less than 12, and decreases in . The probability of the latter event decreases with .S i n c e
ex ante the expected posterior must be equal across all values of , it follows from the convexity of
the follower’s utility function on [012] that the follower should respond with signal  in the case
of having both signals.
Proposition 5. Suppose the follower’s utility is concave on [121], concave at 12, and convex
on [012]. Independent of the leader’s strategy, the follower should respond to a weak signal with
aw e a ks i g n a l ,a n dt oas t r o n gs i g n a lw i t has t r o n gs i g n a l .
We now turn to the optimal strategy of the leader. Suppose that the leader, when having both
signals, presents signal  with probability  and presents signal  with probability 1−,a n dt h e
follower plays the best response strategy, i.e. responds with signal  to signal , and with signal
 to signal .
The audience’s posterior belief that the state is , , contingent on six possible events are
derived as follows.
When the audience is presented with  and , which happens with probability (2−)8,( c a l l
this event , ), we have
 ( )=
1 −  + 
2 − 
.
When the audience is presented with  and , which happens with probability [1−2(1−)]8,
(call this event , ), we have
 ( )=
 − + 2
1 − 2+2 2.
29When the audience is presented with  and  or with  and no evidence, which happens with
probability (1 + )[(1 − )2 + 2]4 (call this joint event ,  or , ∅),w eh a v e
 ( )=(∅)=
(1 − )2
(1 − )2 + 2
W h e nt h ea u d i e n c ei sp r e s e n t e dw i t h and , which happens with probability (1+)(1−)2
(call this event , ), we have
 ( )=1 2.
When the audience is presented with  and no evidence, which happens with probability {1−[(1−
)2 + 2]}8 (call this event , ∅), we have
 (∅)=
[1 − (1 − )](1 − )
1 − [(1 − )2 + 2]
.
The ex ante expected posterior belief must be equal across all values of . We will show that the
ex ante expected utility for the leader for any  is no larger than that for  =0 .W h e n =0 ,t h e
audience’s posterior is equal to 12 with probability 14,i se q u a lt o with probability 18,a n di s
equal to 1 −  with probability 18. It can also be equal to (1 − )2[(1 − )2 + 2] with probability
[(1−)2 +2]4,a n dt o12 with probability (1−)2, but we will disregard the last two terms as
they are common for all values of .
Claim 1:
1
8
(1 − ) ≥ Pr(∅) · ((∅)) +
Pr
∗(  or ∅)
2
· ((  or ∅))
The superscript star at the symbol Pr indicates that the term [(1−)2+2]4, common for all values
of , was disregarded. The claim follows from the fact that
1
8
(1 − )=P r ( ∅) · (∅)+
Pr
∗(  or ∅)
2
· (  or ∅),
1
2
≤ (∅) ≤ 1 −  ≤ (  or ∅),
and the concavity of  on [121].
Represent ( ) as  +( 1− )(12) and ( ) as +( 1− ){2[2 +(1−)2]}.I t
turns out that for every ,w eh a v e
Pr( )+ Pr( )=
1
8
(2)
30and
(1 − )Pr( )=
Pr
∗(  or ∅)
2
.( 3 )
It now follows from (2) and (3) that
Claim 2:
Pr( ) · (( )) + Pr( ) · (( )
≤
1
8
· ()+
Pr
∗(  or ∅)
2
· 
µ
2
(1 − )2 + 2
¶
+( 1− )Pr( ) ·  (12)
Claim 3: Due to the concavity of  at 12,
Pr
∗(  or ∅)
2
· 
µ
(1 − )2
(1 − )2 + 2
¶
+
Pr
∗(  or ∅)
2
· 
µ
2
(1 − )2 + 2
¶
≤
∗
Pr(  or ∅) ·  (12);
recall that
(1 − )2
(1 − )2 + 2 = (  or ∅).
Claim 4:
(1 − )Pr( )+P r*(  or ∅)+P r (  )=1 4
Indeed, Pr( )+Pr( )+Pr*(  or ∅)+Pr( )+Pr(∅)=1 2.T h u s ,w e
obtain the claim from (2), (3) and the fact that Pr(∅)+P r
∗(  or ∅)2=1 8.
Now, we have that Pr( )·(( ))+Pr( )·(( ))+Pr(∅)·((∅))+
Pr*(  or ∅)·((  or ∅))+Pr( )·(( )) ≤ Pr( )·(( ))+
Pr( )·(( ))+(18)·(1−)+[Pr*(  or ∅)2]·((  or ∅))+
Pr( ) · (( )) ≤ (18) · ()+[ P r *(  or ∅)2] · (2[(1 − )2 + 2]) +
(1−)Pr( )·(12)+(18)·(1−)+[Pr*(  or ∅)2]·((  or ∅))+
Pr( )·(( )) ≤ (18)·()+(1−)Pr( )·(12)+(18)·(1−)+Pr*( 
or ∅)·(12)+Pr( )·(( )) ≤ (18)·()+(18)·(1−)+(14)·(12).
The −th inequality follows from Claim ,f o r =1 234.
Proposition 6. Suppose the utility functions of both agents are concave on [121],c o n c a v ea t
12, and convex on [012]. The the leader should play strategy , i.e., present the weak signal 
when she has both signals.
316.2 Correlated versus Independent Evidence
This application turned out to be much less tractable when we allow for mixed strategies. We
were unable to check whether the model predictions are consistent with the experimental ﬁndings of
Glazer and Rubinstein even in the case of high . Although we have managed to ﬁnd out the best
response of the follower to any mixed strategy of the leader (some of the best responses turned out
indeed to be in mixed strategies), the computation of the optimal strategy of the leader happened to
be quite messy. However, the derivation of the leader’s optimal strategy is important for explaining
Glazer and Rubinstein’s ﬁndings even in the pure-strategy case.
7 Appendix B: Strong versus Weak, but Informative, Evi-
dence
In this appendix, we discuss how our analysis of weak vs. strong evidence extends to the case in
which the weak evidence is also informative about the state of the world. In particular, we assume
 =0and 12. By continuity, our results from the main text generalize to the case when 
is suﬃciently close to 12. So, we are particularly interested in situations in which  is not too close
to 12.W er e s t r i c ta t t e n t i o nt ot h ea d v i c ef o rt h ef o l l o w e r ;t h el e a d e r ’ sc a s et u r n so u tt ob em u c h
less tractable.
Suppose ﬁrst that the leader’s strategy is to present the weak signal in the case she has both, and
she brings the weak piece of evidence  in favor of her claim. The follower has at most two pieces of
evidence: a strong signal  and a weak signal . The following table exhibits the posterior belief
o ft h ea u d i e n c et h a t =  under each strategy of the follower, given the signals at the follower’s
disposal:
only  only  both  and 
str.   =1 2  =
(1 − )
2
(1 − )
2 + (1 − )
2  =1 2
str.   =   =
(1 − )
(1 − ) + (1 − )
 =
(1 − )
(1 − ) + (1 − )
1
2
 (1 − ) 1
2
³
(1 − )
2  + 
2 (1 − )
´ 1
2
 (1 − )
Table 10. The leader who plays the strategy to present  when having both, presented 
Proposition 7. (i) Suppose the leader plays the strategy of presenting the weaker signal in the
case of having both signals. If
³

1−
´2
≤
³

1−
´
and the follower’s utility is convex at 12,c o n v e x
32on [012] and concave on [121],t h e nt h ef o l l o w e rs h o u l dr e s p o n dt oaw e a ks i g n a lw i t has t r o n g
signal. Moreover, if the follower’s utility is strictly convex on [012] or strictly concave on [121],
then the follower should strictly prefer responding to a weak signal with a strong signal.
Proof: As shown in Table 10, to compare the follower’s utilities under strategies  and strategy
, we only need to compare two lotteries with the same mean. The lottery generated by strategy
 has outcomes 12 and 1 =
(1−)2
(1−)2+(1−)2, which is lower than 12 if
³

1−
´2
≤
³

1−
´
;a n dt h e
lottery generated by strategy  has outcomes 2 =  and 3 =
(1−)
(1−)+(1−),w h e r e
2 =  1 ≤ 12  3  1 − 2
Since 12  3  1 − 2, by the concavity of  at 12 and its concavity on [121], the line
passing through (2 (2)) and (3 (3)) is above the line passing through (2 (2)) and
(12 (12)). By convexity on [012], the line passing through (1 (1)) and (12 (12))
is below than the line passing through (2 (2)) and (12 (12)). This yields that
str.  () ≤ str.  ().
Similarly, one obtains the strict inequality when  is strictly convex on [012] or strictly concave
on [121].¥
T h ea d v i c ef o rt h ef o l l o w e ri nt h ec a s ew h e n is “small” is therefore diﬀerent from that in the case
when  is close 12. Indeed, It follows from Proposition 1 (i) that the follower should be indiﬀerent
between the two possible responses, when  =1 2 and  is symmetric around 12, i.e.,
1
2

µ
1
2
+ 
¶
+
1
2

µ
1
2
− 
¶
= 
µ
1
2
¶
, for every  ∈ (012],
independently of the shape of  on intervals [012] and [121]. In contrast, the follower should
strictly prefer responding to a weak signal with a strong signal when  is close to , and the follower’s
utility is strictly convex on [012] or strictly concave on [121],e v e nw h e n is symmetric around
12.
Intuitively, an important diﬀerence between the two cases comes from the fact that 1 ≤ 12
when
³

1−
´2
≤
³

1−
´
while 1  12 for  =1 2; recall that strategy  generates a lottery with
outcomes 12 and 1.T h u s ,d i ﬀerent features of the shape of  matter for Propositions 1(i) and
7(i).
Note ﬁnally that the advice for the follower becomes ambiguous when the follower’s utility is
concave at 12. Informally speaking, there is a trade-oﬀ between the eﬀects described in Propositions
331(i) and 7(i), and the advice for the follower depends on the convexity on [012] and the concavity
on [121] compared to the concavity at 12.
Now, suppose the that the leader’s strategy is still to present the weak signal in the case she
has both, but she brings the strong piece of evidence  in favor of her claim. The following table
exhibits the posterior belief of the audience that  =  under each strategy of the follower, given
the signals at the follower’s disposal:
only  only  both  and 
str.   =
(1 − )
2 
(1 − )
2  + 
2 (1 − )
 =1 2  =
(1 − )
2 
(1 − )
2  + 
2 (1 − )
str.   =
(1 − )
2 2
(1 − )
2 2 + 
2 (1 − )
2  =1−   =1− 
1
2
(1 − )
2 
2 + 1
22 (1 − )
2 (1 − )(1 − )
1
2
(1 − )
³

2 +( 1− )
2
´
Table 11. The leader who plays the strategy to present  when having both, presented .
Proposition 7. (continued) (ii) Suppose the leader plays the strategy of presenting the weaker
signal in the case of having both signals and the follower’s utility is concave at 12, convex on [012],
concave on [121].I f is suﬃciently close to , then the follower should respond to a strong signal
with a weak signal.
Proof: As shown in Table 11, to compare the follower’s utilities under strategies  and strategy
, we only need to compare two lotteries with the same mean. The lottery generated by strategy 
has outcomes 12 and 1 =
(1−)2
(1−)2+2(1−), and the lottery generated by strategy  has outcomes
2 =
(1−)22
(1−)22+2(1−)2 and 3 =1− .
When  is suﬃciently close to ,w eh a v e
1 − 3 =  ≤ 2  12  1  3.
Since  is convex on [012] and 1 − 3  2, the line that goes through (2 (2)) and
(12 (12)) is steeper than the line that goes through (1−3 (3)) and (12 (12)).S i n c e
 is concave at 12, it follows that the line that goes through (2 (2)) and (3 (3)) must
be below the line that goes through (12 (12)) and (3 (3)).A l s o ,s i n c e is concave on
[121] and 1  3, the line that goes through (12 (12)) and is (1 (1)) is steeper than
the line that goes through (12 (12)) and is (3 (3)). Hence, the line that goes through
(12 (12)) and is (1 (1)) is above the line that goes through (2 (2)) and (3 (3)).
This yields that
34str.  () ≥ str.  ()
¥
If the leader’s strategy is to present the strong evidence when she has both, then we get similar
results as in Proposition 1 (ii) and (iii). That is, the results on the follower’s optimal strategy
generalize to the case in which the weak piece of evidence is informative if the leader’s strategy is
to present the strong evidence when she has both.
8 Appendix C: Costly Information Acquisition
In this appendix, we consider an alternative but closely related model of costly information acquisi-
tion. We assume that the cost of acquiring one signal is negligible, but the cost of acquiring another
signal is prohibitively large. So, each agent acquires just one signal. Agent  searching for signal 
or  may fail, in which case signal ¬ or ¬, respectively, will be obtained. The signal obtained
by the agents are publicly observed. Each agent decides what signal to acquire just before his turn
to speak. In particular, the follower observes what the leader obtains before deciding what signal to
acquire. The audience observes what signal each agent tries to acquire.
The model of costly information acquisition provides some robustness analysis for the results
obtained within the main text. In particular, one feature of the model studied in the main text is
that the audience must make inference about the strategies of the agents. The audience’s posterior
depends not only on the arguments presented by the agents, but also on the audience belief about
their strategies. In contrast, the audience’s posterior depends only on the presented arguments in
the model of this section.
We show that the results of the two models are consistent. However, we also ﬁnd diﬀerences,
e.g., ones regarding Glazer and Rubinstein’s ﬁndings.
8.1 Weak versus Strong Evidence
As in section 3.1, assume that  =0and =1 2. Suppose the leader’s strategy is to acquire
the weak signal .S i n c e =1 2, the audience’s posterior is independent of what signal the leader
obtains. If the follower decides to acquire the weak signal, then the posterior  is 12,n om a t t e r
what signal the follower obtains. If the follower decides to acquire the strong signal , then the
posterior  is  if the follower obtains ¬ and the posterior  is (1 − ) if the follower obtains .
35Proposition 8. (i) Suppose the leader plays the strategy of acquiring the weak signal. Inde-
pendent of what the leader obtains, if the follower’s utility is concave at 12, she should acquire the
weak signal; if the follower’s utility is convex at 12, she should acquire the strong signal.
Suppose the leader’s strategy is to acquire the strong signal  and she obtains .I ft h ef o l l o w e r
decides to acquire the weak signal, then the posterior  is , no matter what signal the the follower
obtains. If the follower decides to acquire the strong signal, then the posterior  is
³
2
2+(1−)2
´
if
the follower obtains ¬ and the posterior  is 12 if the follower obtains .
Proposition 8. (continued) (ii) Suppose the leader plays the strategy of acquiring the strong
signal  and obtains . If the follower’s utility is convex on [012], she should acquire the strong
signal; if the follower’s utility is concave on [012], she should acquire the weak signal.
Suppose the leader’s strategy is to acquire the strong signal  and she obtains ¬.I f t h e
follower decides to acquire the weak signal, then the posterior  is (1 − ), no matter what signal
the the follower obtains. If the follower decides to acquire the strong signal, then the posterior  is
12 if the follower obtains ¬ and the posterior  is
³
(1−)2
2+(1−)2
´
if the follower obtains .
Proposition 8. (continued) (iii) Suppose the leader plays the strategy of acquiring the strong
signal and obtains ¬. If the follower’s utility is concave on [121], she should acquire the weak
signal; if the follower’s utility is convex on [121], she should acquire the strong signal.
We now turn to the problem of the leader. As in section 4.1, we assume that the players’ utility
functions are convex on [012], concave on [121] and concave at 12.
Suppose the leader plays the strategy of acquiring the weak signal. Then, as shown in Proposition
8 (i), the follower responds by acquiring the weak signal. So, the posterior  is 12 no matter what
signals the players obtain.
Suppose the leader plays the strategy of acquiring the strong signal . If the leader obtains
, then, as shown in Proposition 8 (ii), the follower responds by acquiring the strong signal and
the posterior  is 12 if the follower obtains  and the posterior  is
(1−)2
2+(1−)2 if the follower
obtains ¬. If the leader obtains ¬, then, as shown in Proposition 8 (iii), the follower responds
by acquiring the weak signal and hence the posterior  is  no matter what signal the follower
obtains. Since
(1−)2
2+(1−)2  1 −  and the leader’s utility function is convex on [012], concave on
[121] and concave at 12, the line that goes through ( ()) and
³
(1−)2
2+(1−)2 
³
(1−)2
2+(1−)2
´´
is below (12  (12)). So we have the following result.
36Proposition 9. Suppose both players’ utility functions are convex on [012],c o n c a v eo n[121]
and concave at 12. Then the leader should play the strategy of acquiring the weak signal .
8.2 Correlated versus Independent Evidence
As in section 3.2, assume that  = 12 and 0.
Suppose the leader’s strategy is to acquire the independent signal . Then, no matter what
signal she obtains, the follower is indiﬀerent between acquiring  and acquiring .
Suppose the leader’s strategy is to acquire the correlated signal  and she obtains .I f t h e
follower decides to acquire the correlated signal , then the posterior  is
³
2+(1−)
2+(1−)2+2(1−)
´
if
the follower obtains ¬ and the posterior  is 12 if the follower obtains . If the follower decides
to acquire the independent signal , then the posterior  is
³
2
2+(1−)2
´
if the follower obtains ¬
and the posterior  is 12 if the follower obtains .S i n c e 2
2+(1−)2 
2+(1−)
2+(1−)2+2(1−)  12,
there is more dispersion in the audience’s posterior if the follower acquires the independent signal.
Proposition 10. (i) Suppose the leader plays the strategy of acquiring the correlated signal 
and obtains . If the follower’s utility is convex on [012], then she should acquire the independent
signal . If the follower’s utility is concave on [012], then she should acquire the correlated signal
.
Suppose the leader’s strategy is to acquire the correlated signal  and she obtains ¬.I ft h e
follower decides to acquire the correlated signal , then the posterior  is 12 if the follower obtains
¬ and the posterior  is
³
(1−)
2+(1−)
2+(1−)2+2(1−)
´
if the follower obtains . If the follower decides
to acquire the independent signal ,t h e nt h ep o s t e r i o r is 12 if the follower obtains ¬ and the
posterior  is
³
(1−)2
2+(1−)2
´
if the follower obtains .S i n c e12 
(1−)2+(1−)
2+(1−)2+2(1−) 
(1−)2
2+(1−)2,
there is more dispersion in the audience’s posterior if the follower acquires the independent signal.
Proposition 10. (continued) (ii) Suppose the leader plays the strategy of acquiring the cor-
related signal  and obtains ¬. If the follower’s utility is convex on [121], then she should
acquire the independent signal . If the follower’s utility is concave on [121], then she should
acquire the correlated signal .
We now turn to the problem of the leader. As in section 4.2, assume that each agent’s utility
is convex on [012] and concave on [121]. As shown in Proposition 10 (i), if the leader plays
the strategy of acquiring the signal  and obtains , then the follower responds by acquiring the
independent signal . If the leader plays the strategy of acquiring the signal  and obtains ,
37then the follower is indiﬀerent between acquiring  and acquiring . We can therefore without
loss of generality assume that the follower responds by acquiring the signal . Hence, the leader
faces the same lotteries if she successfully obtains the signal that she decided to acquire, no matter
what her strategy is. On the other hand, if the leader plays the strategy of acquiring the signal
 and obtains ¬, then, as shown in Proposition 10 (ii), the follower responds by acquiring the
correlated signal .T h e p o s t e r i o r  is 12 if the follower obtains ¬ and the posterior  is
³
2+(1−)
2+(1−)2+2(1−)
´
if the follower obtains . If the leader plays the strategy of acquiring the
signal  and obtains ¬, the follower is indiﬀerent between acquiring  and acquiring . Again
without loss of generality, we assume that the follower responds by acquiring the signal .T h e
posterior  is 12 if the follower obtains ¬ and the posterior  is
³
2
2+(1−)2
´
if the follower
obtains .S i n c e 2
2+(1−)2 
2+(1−)
2+(1−)2+2(1−)  12,t h ep o s t e r i o r has more dispersion on
[012] if the leader’s strategy is to acquire the independent signal .
Proposition 11. Suppose both players’ utility functions are convex on [012], concave on
[121]. Then the leader should play the strategy of acquiring signal .
How can the Glazer-Rubinstein ﬁndings be reconciled with the model of costly information
acquisition? One way is to consider a hypothetical scenario in which the leader happened to play
the strategy of acquiring the correlated signal , and obtains signal . This scenario indeed seems
to be suggested to the subjects in the experiment. Then, Proposition 10 (i) says that the strategy 
is preferred by an agent who is risk averse with respect to the audience posterior beliefs on interval
[012]. This is a qualitatively diﬀerent assumption compared to ones needed to explain the ﬁndings
within the model from the main text.
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